Insecurity, Forced Migration, And Internally Displaced Persons along the Cameroon-Nigeria Border, 2003-2018

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By

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Abstract

The Cameroon-Nigeria border is plagued with insecurity challenges and serious threats to the border communities. Following the Boko Haram attacks, the counter-offensive by the Cameroonian and Nigerian armed forces, and the attacks between the Southern Cameroons separatists and the Cameroonian forces as a result of the Anglophone Crisis, the population along the Cameroon-Nigeria border were forced to abandon their towns and villages into neighboring communities. This forced-migration has orchestrated the influx of refugees into both Cameroon and Nigeria, and internal displacement of many people. This article traces the complex insecurity situation that prompted forced migration and massive internal displacement of populations which paralyzed border activities. The study adopts the qualitative method and the descriptive and analytical approaches to assess the complex insecurity situations that resulted from the activities of the Boko Haram Terrorist Group and the Anglophone Crisis. The study recommends that, any peace process that ignores the needs and roles of the border communities is unnatural, and therefore inherently unstable. The contention here is that Cameroon and Nigeria need to cooperate for effectiveness in border policy with greater attention to the endeavors of border communities.

Key Words: Cameroon-Nigeria Border, Insecurity, Forced Migration, Boko Haram, Anglophone Crisis, Internally Displaced.

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Introduction
Border problems are of great significance to modern states in the world and particularly to the African continent. The significance is derived from the fact that borders limit political, economic, social-cultural, and strategic influences. The defect of any border usually creates conflicts between tribes, villages, and nations. In Africa, border insecurity is recurrent because most of the borders were defined by the colonial masters who neither mastered the territories nor took into consideration the cultural identities of the natives (Fonkeng, 2014). The Cameroon-Nigeria border stretches from Lake Chad in the north, to the Bight of Biafra in the Atlantic Ocean, covering a distance of almost 1800 kilometres. The border has witnessed recurrent insecurity threats which forced the population to migrate to other areas as refugees while others were displaced internally to other communities. The armed insurrection of Boko Haram in north east Nigeria, offers a grid for analysis from triple angles, notably: forced migration, refugee crises, and internally displaced persons (Mbarkoutou, 2014).

Since 2011, the shared borders between north east Nigeria and the Extreme North of Cameroon have become the object of repeated Boko Haram assaults and the violent counter offensives of the Nigerian army, provoking forced displacement and refugee crises. Furthermore, since the end of 2016, Cameroon has been facing a sociopolitical crisis in its Anglophone Regions of North West and South West all situated along the Cameroon-Nigeria border zone. The crisis originated in protests initiated by lawyers and teachers who demanded several reforms from the government of Cameroon. When the government delayed to initiate reforms, violence erupted in the two Anglophone regions leading to the death of several people, others were forced to migrate to neighboring Nigeria as refugees, while others were displaced into other communities and some into bushes and forests (NewAfrican Magazine, 2018).

This paper therefore seeks to analyze how Boko Haram’s violent attacks and the reprisals of the Nigerian army together, with the Anglophone Crisis against the government of Cameroon, engendered the depopulation of the frontier zones, the influx of refugees to Cameroon and Nigeria and internally displaced persons to other communities beyond the border zone. The recurrent waves
of displacements negatively affected the socio-cultural cohesion as well as economic and political systems of the various communities along the border.

**Conceptualizing Insecurity and Forced Migration**

Many political analysts argue that most of the post-independence insecurity crises along the Cameroon-Nigeria border are results of colonial legacy, the introduction of new socio-economic and political structures, and the changing nature of the States (Kraler 2005). Most African governments practice a system of differential and preferential treatment of Africans based on regional, tribal, status, and ethnic differences. Recurrent insecurity challenges experienced along the Cameroon-Nigeria border are thus often the direct results of exclusionary policies pursued by newly independent regimes that in important ways can be seen as a continuation of similar colonial policies. The insecurity often opposed ruling groups trying to maintain the status quo on the one hand, and excluded group(s) demanding for change, on the other. Thus, in general, struggles over the control of political and economic power, and concomitant massive human rights abuses, including widespread violence, result to forced migration and internally displaced persons along the border zone. Moreover, cases of insecurity that cause population displacement are, in many instances, results of failure or unwillingness of certain governments to resolve long-standing ethnic tensions (Chazan et al., 1999) or the tendency of certain governments to oppress particular population groups as observed in the current Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon.

The phenomenon of forced migration is fraught with controversial and, sometimes, contradictory interpretations and connotations. We talk of forced migration in opposition to voluntary migration. In this way, displacement is viewed from its causes and/or from its purpose. Thus, we may talk of economic migration as opposed to socio-political migration (Turton, 2003). Whereas the former refers to migrants who leave their respective residence and settle elsewhere in search of economic
opportunities such as employment, business opportunities, education, etc. (Berger, 1987; Adepoju, 1989), the latter refers to migrations caused by social and political problems such as armed conflicts, insecurity, human rights violations, natural disasters, etc. (Berger, 1987; Bolzman, 1996; Anthony, 1999). In the latter cases, forced migrants, commonly referred to as refugees, flee their places of residence for their physical security and protection from imminent threats to their physical well-being. Thus, Nick Van Hear (1998, 44) talks of voluntary as opposed to involuntary nature of the forces that lead to migration. Anthony Richmond (1994, 59) distinguishes between ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ migration. He classifies migrants in two main categories of those with agency (choice) and those without agency; forced migrants being those with little or no agency. In migration discourse, the debate revolves around voluntary migration as opposed to forced migration. Forced migrations are also divided into two categories depending on the causes of displacement. We can distinguish between forced migration caused by natural disasters on the one hand, and on the other hand, forced migration caused by violence and/or armed conflict and insecurity (also known as man-made displacement) and repressive state policies and persecution (that is, refugee migration in a narrow sense, as defined by international humanitarian law) (Sen, 1981).

The realities along the Cameroon-Nigeria border show many instances where the delimitation between these types of migration occurs. Their causes also present socio-political and economic factors as observed in the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon with consequences being the influx of high waves of refugees in both Cameroon and Nigeria.

According to Kunz (1973), refugees are different from voluntary migrants in that they have to leave their homeland against their will, with no positive motivation to settle anywhere else. Olson (1979) points out that refugees differ from other migrants in that refugees are forced to leave their homes because of a change in their environment which makes it impossible to continue life as they have
known it. They are coerced by an external force to leave their homes and go elsewhere. In Kunz’s theoretical framework, immigrants are seen as pulled and attracted to the new land by opportunities and better living conditions obtainable there. Refugees on the other hand are not pulled out but rather they are pushed out of their homelands. However, in African migration reality, the push-pull factor as conceived in Kunz’s theoretical framework is not easily demarcated with regard to the distinction between economic migrants and refugees. This study argues that the majority of migrants along the Cameroon-Nigeria border currently experienced forced migration and are displaced internally as a result of recurrent insecurity exacerbated by the Boko Haram Terrorist Group and the Anglophone Crisis.

**Boko Haram and Insecurity**

Cameroon and Nigeria today stand at the center of several threats from radical movements that crop up in neighboring countries especially from the Boko Haram sect of Nigeria. Boko Haram controls about 20,000sq km of land in the three northern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. In early 2013, its area of operation stretched from the Mandara Mountains on the eastern border with Cameroon, to Lake Chad in the north, and the Yedseram River in the west. It is estimated that by the end of 2014, the extremist group controlled about twenty of the twenty-seven Local Government Area (LGA) in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, with a population of over one million, seven hundred thousand inhabitants (Fonkeng, 2016). It was in this vast area in north-eastern Nigeria that the Islamist group declared an Islamic Caliphate in August 2014.

Boko Haram is not only a threat to Nigeria but across its borders and its international dimension makes it a real threat to Chad, Niger, Benin and Cameroon. The sect made major incursions along the Cameroon-Nigeria border in recent years and has been involved in deadly attacks and kidnappings. The first attack of Boko Haram along the Cameroon-Nigeria border was the kidnap of a French national, Moulin-Founier, his family, and friend, in the far north of Cameroon on February 19 2013. They were released by the Islamist sect after the payment of a ransom by the Cameroon
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Government on April 13, 2013 and were handed to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Next was the kidnap of Reverend Father George Vanden Beuch, a French priest who was taken to Nigeria before being released to the Cameroon Government. The third attack was the kidnapping of Reverend Father Antonio Giovani Allegri and Paolo Giovani both Italians and a Canadian Sister, Rev. Gilberte Bissiere, from a Cameroonian village along the border with northern Nigeria (Ngah, 2014). This was followed by the kidnapping of ten Chinese engineers in the town of Waza, northern Cameroon in May 2014. Boko Haram’s activities along the Cameroon-Nigeria border influenced the summoning of a Security Conference in Paris, France.

After the Summit of May 2014 in Paris, France, on security concerns in West and Central Africa as a result of Boko Haram activities, several attacks were launched in northern Cameroon by the Boko Haram sect as a result of President Paul Biya’s declaration of war. From May 17 to November 10 2014, there were eighteen Boko Haram attacks against Cameroonian troops resulting to the dearth of thirty-three soldiers and over 1000 Boko Haram fighters who were estimated to number about 20,000, along the Cameroon-Nigeria border. The most violent Boko Haram attacks along the border occurred in December 2014. According to Fonkeng (2016), on December 12, close to 600 Boko Haram fighters crossed Lake Chad and launched simultaneous attacks on the villages of Ngouma, Sagme, Ardebo, Dambore, and Soueram, but were repelled by Cameroonian forces. At the same period, another group from Borno attacked the towns of Bankim, Amchide, and Limani, all along the border area. On December 26-28 2014, about 1000 Boko Haram fighters launched simultaneous attacks on the towns of Makary, Amchide, Limani, and Mbaljuel. The sect also temporarily took control of the Cameroon Army base in Achigachia in early 2014 and was later dislodged through airstrikes by the Cameroonian Air force (Tande 2015).

When insecurity persisted along the Cameroon-Nigeria border due to the unrelenting attacks by the Boko Haram fighters, the Cameroon Government reorganized its border security in March 2014, by
deploying close to 700 troops to patrol the borders of northern Cameroon. In August 2014, Cameroon’s military command structure was reorganized in cognizance of the Boko Haram extremist. A Presidential Decree created a new military region with headquarters in Maroua in the Far North region, and the 41’st motorized Infantry with headquarters in Kousseri in the Far North (Cameroon Tribune, 2014). The Cameroon soldiers of the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) patrolling the northern border with Nigeria have put a stiff resistance and successfully reduced the Boko Haram attacks. Currently, the Cameroon-Nigeria Border is plagued with severe insecurity crisis as a result of the Anglophone Crisis between separatists from Anglophone Cameroon fighting to secede from the Republic of Cameroon.

Anglophone Crisis and Insecurity

The Anglophone Crisis originated from a series of grievances in the two English Speaking Regions of Cameroon. Some of these grievances are:

- The failure of successive Governments of Cameroon, since 1961, to respect and implement the articles of the constitution that uphold and safeguard what British Southern Cameroons brought along to the union in 1961;
- The flagrant disregard for the constitution, demonstrated by the dissolution of political parties and the formation of one political party in 1966, and other such acts judged by the West Cameroonians to be unconstitutional and undemocratic;
- The cavalier management of the 1972 referendum which took out the foundational elements (federalism) of the 1961 constitution;
- The 1984 law amending the constitution, which gave the country the original East Cameroon name (the Republic of Cameroon) and thereby erased the identity of the West Cameroonians from the original union. West Cameroon, which had entered the union as an equal partner effectively ceased to exist. It involved a deliberate and systematic erosion of the West...
Cameroon cultural identity which the 1961 constitution sought to preserve and protect by providing for a bi-cultural federation (Bishops Letter to the President, 2017).

These grievances culminated to protest in the Anglophone region by October 2016.

Since October 2006, Cameroon has been facing socio-political crises in the two Anglophone regions of the country. One of the first events of the crisis was a strike held by Lawyers from the two regions, which occurred from 10th to 21st October 2016. The Lawyers were protesting against the government’s failure to produce the English version of the OHADA Law and its interference to destroy the Common Law System inherited from the British which was practiced in the English-speaking Zones (NewAfrican Magazine, 2018). The Lawyers subsequently sought support from traditional rulers, trade unions, and the entire population of the two regions to abandon their duties and functions in the government of the Republic of Cameroon. The Lawyers held meetings in Bamenda and Buea, and came out with the following proposals: A call for the return of a two-states Federation that existed before 1972, and on the government to cease from sending Francophone Magistrates to Anglophone Courts. By late November, armed security forces pursued Common Law Lawyers who embarked on a peaceful protest in Bamenda and Buea. Lawyers were severely tortured, their gowns and wigs ceased, while some sustained injuries from rubber bullets.

On November 21 2016, Anglophone Teachers who had written to the Prime Minister Philemon Yang about their grievances but without any response also decided to embark on a strike action. The “Coffin Revolution”, a strike action by a Private Radio Animator, Mancho Bibixy, was also observed in Bamenda the capital city of North West Region concurrently with the Teachers strike. Mancho’s Bibixy peaceful march against the poor state of roads in Bamenda town and the inefficiency of the city council authorities to develop Bamenda town, turned violent when security forces attacked the peaceful crowd. Hundreds of protesters wielding peace plants clashed with armed troops, and many people were arrested. Later in that same month, a student protest on the campus of the University of Buea in the South West Region met with violent repression from security forces. Hundreds of
students were arrested and detained, some were forced into stagnant water and mud, while the security forces moved into the students’ residential areas and arrested students in their rooms (The Scoop People Magazine, 2018).

The crisis in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon intensified on 22nd September and 1st October 2017. On 22 September 2017, close to 80,000 people protested across thirty Anglophone towns and communities (Bamenda, Buea, Kumba, Kumbo, Limbe, etc.) to demand the release of Anglophone political prisoners, the departure of President Biya, the implementation of federalism, and secession (NewAfrican Magazine, 2018). The demonstrations were organized to coincide with President Biya’s speech to the UN General Assembly. Initially peaceful, these protest marches turned violent in some areas. In Buea, some protesters vandalized the home of the town’s mayor (an Anglophone but a fierce opponent and a staunch supporter of the regime). In Mamfe, a police station was set on fire. Overreaction on the part of the defense and security forces in Santa, Bamenda, Ekona, and Limbe resulted to the death of four protesters, with dozens more injured. The scale of the demonstrations on 22 September, the largest in Cameroon since February 2008, seemed to have surprised authorities, who had until then underestimated Anglophone discontent and the weight of the secessionist movement. This was probably what prompted the government to deploy more 1,000 soldiers and imposed a de facto state of emergency and martial law, and the military arrested civilians who were transported to the capital city Yaounde, judged in military courts, and sentence passed on them following the Terrorism Law.

On October 1, tens of thousands of people began a peaceful march (holding tree branches symbolizing peace, and chanting “no violence”) to proclaim the independence of Ambazonia (the name given by secessionists to their future state). In Bamenda, Buea, and across dozens of towns and communities, people marched and hoisted Ambazonian flags at intersections and at the residences of traditional chiefs as well as at a police station and a gendarmerie post. Independence was symbolically proclaimed in chiefs’ compounds. Defense and security forces responded with
disproportionate force, leading to at least 40 deaths and over 100 injured protesters between September and October. This death toll is the result of live ammunitions and excessive use of tear gas, including in homes and against the faithful as they left church. Defense and security forces arrested hundreds of people along the streets and in their houses without warrant (International Crisis Group, 2017). They made use of torture and inhuman and degrading treatments. Sexual abuse, destruction of property, and looting of homes by soldiers and police, as well as shooting from helicopters at protesters in Kumba, Bamenda, and near Buea, were reported by a dozen residents, local politicians, senior officials, the press, human rights organizations, and the Catholic Bishops of the two regions.

The villages of secessionist leaders such as Ewele, Akwaya, Eyumodjock, and Ekona were targeted by the defense and security forces, forcing thousands of young men to flee to the bush for fear of being killed, or arrested and tortured. According to eye witness statements from locals, a policeman and a soldier deployed in the zone, “soldiers are murdering some people in their homes and shooting at the feet of others”. On his Facebook page, the former Supreme Court judge, Ayah Paul Abine, claimed to have escaped assassination at his home in Akwaya, a border town with Nigeria. It was also reported that his house was looted by soldiers. Violence, arrests, and looting, by the military and police continued throughout the month of October, notably in the border town of Ekok in Manyu Division. Suspected for promoting secessionist ideas, Deputy Mayor of Ndu was killed at his residence by the military (International Crisis Group, 2017). This widespread violence took place during a de facto state of emergency and martial law, imposed by the two regional governors from 29 September to 3 October: they enforced curfews, banned demonstrations and gatherings of more than four people, closed regional land and sea borders, brought in military reinforcements, banned all movements from one Division to another, banned motorcycling, and cut off social networks, followed by the internet, and electricity.
On October 1 2017, people were also forbidden from leaving their homes. Some senior officials and high-ranking officers explained the need for these excessive measures by a lack of police officers, which had to be compensated through military reinforcements, untrained in crowd control. They also pointed to insufficient police equipment, the lack of blank cartridges, and inadequate stock or misuse of tear gas. Their claim was that gendarmes and police officers mismanaged their stock of tear gas, which were insufficient by using it in homes, and ran out of stocks when faced with protesters. These high-ranking officers also accused protesters of inciting unrest by burning vehicles that belonged to the Divisional Officer and Senior Divisional Officer in Boyo and Fundong in the Northwest Region. Protesters also snatched weapons from gendarmes in Kumba in the Southwest Region, ransacked the police stations of Ikiliwindi, Mabanda, Teke, and Kongle, and stoned at police and military in Buea and Bamenda. Finally, they pointed out that some police officers and military personnel refused to participate in the violence, which meant that the security apparatus was understaffed (Reuters, 2017).

The conflagration of the crisis and the massacre of 1 October were predictable, especially since the declaration of independence and demonstrations were announced beforehand. The violence was an intensification of the crisis which had grown throughout the month of August.

Since January 2018, the situation in the Anglophone region unfortunately transformed into a guerrilla war fare with armed men, under the banner of Ambazonia Defense Force (ADF) fighting in support of the Anglophones, carrying out sporadic attacks against government forces. This situation further intensified insecurity along the border zone and even further into the interior as hundreds of civilians were killed, with government forces registering several casualties from the secessionist fighters. Government forces were reinforced and they continued with intense attacks on villages, set some on fire, looted the homes of, and killed several unarmed, civilians, with the intention to neutralize the Ambazonian fighters (The Summit Magazine, 2018). Recently, the Ambazonian fighters resorted to kidnapping government officials in the Anglophone zone. In February 2018, the Divisional Officer for Batibo, Marcel Namata Diteng, and the Regional Delegate for Social Affairs for North West
Region, Animbom Aaron, were kidnapped by unidentified men. In April, the Chairman of the General Certificate of Education Board (GCE), Prof. Ivo Leke Tambo, was kidnapped but later released after the payment of ransom to the ADF fighters. The trend of kidnappings continued with several Municipal Councilors and traditional rulers who sympathized with the government abducted. The latest kidnappings were those of former vice president of the South West Court of Appeal, Justice Martin Mbeng; the Principal of Government High School Bolifamba in Mile 16 Buea, Mrs. Georgiana Enanga Sanga; and the Principal of Cameroon Baptist Academy in Muyuka Sub Division, Erick Ngumba. Throughout the month of May, there were severe battles between the Ambazonian fighters and government forces in several towns and villages to destabilize the celebration of May 20th Cameroon’s National Day in the Anglophone zone (The Scoop People Magazine, 2018). Since the beginning of the crisis in October 2016, at least 150 persons have been killed in the Anglophone Zone; several hundreds injured; hundreds more arrested in the Anglophone regions and deported to prison cells in Yaounde; thousands forced to migrate to neighboring Nigeria as refugees, while thousands have become internally displaced persons living in other towns, villages, bushes and forests in the country.

Forced Migration

Few studies have attempted to identify roaming refugees suffering from a high sense of insecurity and forced displacement due to ethno-religious causes. However, by adopting a descriptive approach, it is possible to analyze the migratory itinerary, refugee influx, and the internally displaced. In late 2013, the Boko Haram insurgence forced millions of people to migrate towards the Cameroon-Nigeria border in successive waves. The first set of migrants entered Madagali, (Nigeria) via Tourou and Mogode (Cameroon) at the border of Adamawa and the South West region. They temporarily settled in the villages of Zhelevet in the sub-divisions of Moyo-Mosoka, Gawar, and Minawaou in the Moko sub-division. The second entry route was through the Kerewa locality from where the refugees proceeded to settle in Assighassic, Kolofata, and Mora in the Moyo Sava division. The first

massive wave of refugees estimated at 20,000 people, arrived from Bama in Nigeria in August 2013 and sought refuge in Amchide, Kolofata, and Mora in Cameroon (Strategic Prospective Analysis Bulletin, EIFORCES 2014). According to the UNHCR, several people were forced to migrate and settle along the border region as refugees exceeded the Minawaou capacity of 39,000. The UN Organ maintained that in 2014, new arrivals fled recurrent attacks over a three week period in the region of Gwoza in the Borno state of Nigeria before settling in Cameroon as refugees.

Other waves of refugees found shelter in Cameroon through highly insecure routes. In March 2014, several waves, 7500 refugees, who fled prolonged fighting in the Borno and Yobe states in particular, were said to be in an “emergency situation” in the Moyo Sava division. Faced with the escalation of violence, 4,200 refugees migrated and regrouped in Kolofata and Amchide, and 600 in Waza, were registered in 2013 (Mbarkoutou, 2014). According to administrative authorities, 5,500 refugees arrived Kolofata, 3,000 in Kerawa, and 370 in Mora, and certain localities in Moyo–Sava of Logone, and Chari. About 90% of the population of Kerawa in Nigeria and other small villages, for instance, took refuge in Cameroon. In Fotokol in Logone and Chari, a temporary camp welcomed approximately 5,000 Nigerian refugees from Gambaburu-Ngala, following its capture by Boko Haram (Fonkeng, 2016). Furthermore, several waves of refugees migrated and settled in temporary camps, after which they were transferred to the Minawaou camp near Mokolo. In total, since the beginning of the crisis, the Cameroonian localities reported the arrival of 43,720 Nigerian refugees; 26,720 were registered by the UNHCR.

Following the recent Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon, several indigenes along the Cameroon-Nigeria border were forced to migrate to neighboring Nigeria as refugees. The border towns and villages that experienced forced migration to Nigeria were Ekok, Kembong, Eyumojock, Akwaya, Egbekaw, Mamfe Central, and other localities in Manyu Division (The Summit Magazine, 2018). The population that was forced to migrate to Nigeria as refugees increased to over 21,000 persons, composed mostly of women and children. With the deplorable insecurity situation in the Anglophone
zone, latest statistics show that there are 22,291 refugees in Cross River State, 17,003 in Benue State, 3,525 in Akwa Ibom State, and 584 in Taraba State in neighboring Nigeria. These form a basis to hold the view that the Cameroon-Nigeria border towns and villages are witnessing the worst refugee crisis as a result of recurrent insecurity in the area (United Nations Refugee Agency, 2018).

**Internally Displaced Persons**

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reported that, in June 2014 the number of internally displaced persons stood at 250,000 as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency. The first effects were felt at the internal level with 17,000 internally displaced persons cramped in six camps along the Cameroon-Nigeria border. The crisis in North-eastern Nigeria displaced about 70,000 persons towards neighboring Niger, and about 1,600 others towards Chad. Approximately 650,000 persons were internally displaced in North-eastern Nigeria due to the Boko Haram insurgency (Strategic and Prospective Analysis Bulletin, 2014). The immediate consequence for Cameroon was the increase in internally displaced persons as a result of constant attacks by Boko Haram terrorists on the various refugee camps on its territory. The border towns of Doumo and Mayo Oulo in the division of Moyo Louti in the Northern region welcomed thousands of internally displaced people.

Authorities of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Cameroon reported that some Nigerian displaced population along the border settled at border localities in Cameroon such as Guider, Figuil, Bauurha, and Koza. In the month of November, the Bourho sub-division of the division of Moyo Sava registered several numbers of displaced people from refugee camps and the border fleeing Boko Haram insurgency. Approximately 11,000 people, including 250 Nigerian soldiers and police officers, occupied schools, garages, and other public private buildings in areas such as Garoua, Guider, and Figuil along the border (The Median News Paper, 2016). The general phenomenon of internal displacement of populations paralyzed the Nigerian villages of Belel and Sarow, 50km away from Gashiga, and divisions of Benue and Mayo Louti as the villages were completely deserted.
The Anglophone Crisis in the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon generated significant internal displacements along the Cameroon-Nigeria border and further into the interior of the country. The number of people internally displaced from towns to villages and from villages to bushes and forests increased tremendously since November 2017. Recent findings revealed that over 160,000 people were internally displaced in the two affected regions of Cameroon. The South West Region contains 90 percent of the over 160,000 people with 135,000 located in Meme Division, 15,000 in Manyu Division, and about 10,000 in the North West Region (The Horizon Newspaper, 2018). Several inhabitants of Meme Division were forced to abandon their homes and escaped into neighboring communities as a result of constant gun shots, burning, and looting of their localities for close to one month. Several inhabitants of the villages of Kake 1, Kake 11, and Diffa in Kumba 1 Sub-Division; Mukonje, Malende, Etam, and Ekiliwindi in Kumba 11 Sub-Division; and Small Ekumbe, Kwa Kwa, Bole, Kombone in Mbonge Sub-Division, were internally displaced into different towns and villages while some moved into the forests for safety.

**Policy Options and Recommendations**

Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Benin, Central African Republic, and other countries affected by the Boko Haram terrorist group should strengthen coordination and cooperation in combating crimes that are connected with terrorism, including drug trafficking in all its forms, illicit arms trade, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, money laundering, and smuggling of nuclear weapons and other deadly materials. They should ensure the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts, in accordance with provisions of national and international laws, including human rights laws, refugees’ laws, and international humanitarian laws. In this regard, they should ensure that their territories are not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of acts intended to be committed against other states or their citizens. Recruitments for terrorist activities tend to be most successful in regions that lack developmental projects and are plagued with high rates of unemployment. The situation aggravates when these areas
are safe havens for terrorists like in Northern Nigeria. The high rates of unemployment and illiteracy that exist in the Northern parts of Cameroon and Nigeria worked to the advantage of the Boko Haram terrorists as desperate youths who needed employment easily found jobs as soldiers, suicide bombers, and intelligence agents in the terrorist group. The Governments of Cameroon and Nigeria need to carry out massive socio-economic development along their common border which stretches from Lake Chad to the Atlantic Ocean, with developmental projects geared towards job creation for the youths.

Following the recurrent insecurity situations along the Cameroon-Nigeria Border, the governments of the two countries are more involved in military activities to diffuse tensions. However, this is not a sustainable solution to the crisis. Such military activities should be accorded less attention, while more attention should be diverted to health, education, and infrastructure, which are issues of more vital concern to the indigenes.

In most cases of peacebuilding (reconstruction efforts after conflict termination), it is the integrity of the state that is often given security priority. Insecurity is, in other words, synonymous with an attack on the integrity of the state. As a result of this unidimensional, state-centric view of security, many states confronted with civil strife have been unable to resolve their difficulties. Besides, many peacebuilding efforts undermine the emphasis on human security because people are viewed as the "means" to political stability as opposed to being the "end" of all peacebuilding efforts. People are also viewed as the means to a stable state conducive to the infiltration of globalization trends (Morgan, 2005). Therefore, reforms to prevent insecurity along the Cameroon-Nigeria Border should be people-centered, including local participation from indigenes in the area.

Local knowledge is a critical factor for sustainable development and as such the empowerment of local communities is a prerequisite for a sustainable development process. The integration of appropriate local knowledge into development programs for the local communities along the Cameroon-Nigeria border will contribute to efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainable development.
Local Knowledge needs to be constantly used, challenged, and further adapted to the rich economic potentials in the area. Supporting local initiatives can help disseminate useful and relevant knowledge which could enable communities participate more actively in the development process.
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